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Strength and Weakness in Four Coalition Situations
J. Keith Murnighan
Abstract
Five-person groups forced a total of 12 coalitions in each of four
coalition games, with one group playing each of the 24 possible orderings of
the games. The frequencies of the different coalitions and the outcomes of
the players in the most frequent coalitions were compared to the predictions
of four social psychological models of coalition behavior. The results,
for both frequencies and for outcomes, supported Bargaining theory (Komorita
and Chertkoff, 1973) over the Weighted Probability model, Minimum Resource,
and Minimum Power theories. In addition, the overall payoffs of the players
(including zero payoffs on trials where the player was excluded from the
winning coalition) were compared to the Shapley value, yielding some support
for the notion that the Shapley value can be used as a measure of what payoffs
a player might expect to receive from playing the game (Roth, 1977). It was
also suggested that a player's overall payoffs may be a more appropriate post
hoc measure of one's power in the game. Finally, the data clarify the condi-
tions where the "strength is weakness" phenomenon might be expected to occur.
The payoffs of the players in positions which have equal Shapley values but
different resources, within a particular game, resulted in the "strength is
weakness" phenomenon. On the other hand, players in positions with rela-
tively high Shapley values obtained payoffs that were considerably higher
than players with low Shapley values, within the same game. In addition,
reports of the players concerning their choice of strategies yielded informa-
tion that may explain the underlying causes of this phenomenon.
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The study of coalition behavior has traditionally been approached by
discussing power differences among the individuals or parties in coalition
situations. Caplow's (1956) original theory, for instance, focused primarily
on the use of control. Minimum Power theory, based on notions of pivotal
power (Shapley, 1953). also focused directly on the power of the parties
involved. Other models of coalition behavior (e.g., Gamson, 1961; Komorita,
1974; Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973) have discussed differences in resources
and the strength of the players. Researchers on coalition behavior, however,
have most often addressed the accuracy of the models and have only infre-
quently discussed the relationship between coalition data and the power of
the parties in coalition games. The present paper reports data from four
coalition games, and discusses the results both in terms of the accuracy
of the different models' predictions and the inferences that can be drawn
concerning the power of the participants.
Even though the concept of power is central to the study of coalition
formation, explicit definitions of the power of the players before and after
the play of a game are rare. Early research and theory (e.g., Caplow, 1956;
Gamson, 1961; Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957) are not specific about the bases
of power, but imply that a player's strength increases with resources.
Similarly, the frequency of inclusion in winning coalitions has been impli-
citly adopted as a post hoc measure of power in coalition games. Thus,
Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) reported the frequencies of coalitions in six
three-person games, and stated that the triad situation may lead to more
frequent inclusion of weaker members (those with less resources) over those
who are initially stronger (those with more resources). This result has
subsequently been labelled the "strength is weakness" phenomenon, indicating
that players with greater resources (a_ priori strength) are included in few
winning coalitions ( post hoc weakness)
.
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Unlike the social psychological models, the power of players in coali-
tion situations has been formally defined in the game theoretic literature.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), also called pivotal power (Gamson, 1964),
has been used as an index of power in many different types of games (Shapley
and Shubik, 1954). It is calculated by dividing the number of times a
person's resources are "pivotal" (in the sense that a losing coalition is
converted to a winning coalition by the addition of this person) by the
total number of winning permutations of the players. For instance, in the
most often studied three-person game, where the three players are assigned
4, 3 and 2 votes and a majority of 5 votes is needed to form a winning
coalition, there are twelve permutations of winning coalitions. Each of
the players is pivotal in four of these coalitions; thus, each has a Shapley
value of 1/3. Shapley and Shubik (1954) have also shown that the Shapley
value can be used to measure the a priori power of the stockholders in a
company (where an individual's Shapley value, is a function of both the
number of shares he holds and the distribution of the remaining shares) or
the power of the President in passing legislation, vis a vis the Senate and
the Houst of Representatives.
The Shapley value's initial formulation has been interpreted as result-
ing in a process of coalition formation that entails adding one player to
an existing coalition, and then another, etc., until the coalition of all the
players has formed. The average payoffs of the players in this coalition,
then, could be compared to the Shapley value to determine its predictive
accuracy. Most research, however, has excluded the possibility of the coali-
tion of all the players. Thus, the Shapley value's potential as a predictor
of the power of the players has not been realized.
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Recently, however, Roth (19/7) has shown chat the Shapley value equals
the proportion of the total payoff that a risk neutral player (i.e., an
individual who neither prefers nor avoids economic risk) should expect from
the play of a game, Thus, a comparison of a player's overall payoffs in
a sequential bargaining gacie can he compared to the Shapley value, to determine
if such an expectation is appropriate. In addition, the payoffs the players
obtain can be u:;ed j.s a post hoc measure of tne players' power. Payoffs
can easily be contrasted with the previously used measure of power, frequency
of inclusion in the winning coaliation through the use of an example. If
inclusion is used as the criterion., player X, who is included often but
receives relatively low outcomes when he is included, will appear to be as
powerful as player Y who is also included often but receives relatively
high outcomes each time. The use cf payoffs as a measure of power takes
into account both inclusion and the player's outcomes when he is included.
Thus, use of the player's payoffs as a measure of their ;.ower would result
in player Y appearing subsra; LI ;nore powerful than player X.
The social psychological models, on che other hand, have attempted to
predict the most frecue-. ;:-..'
i
• n and the players' outcomes fa such
coalitions. Outcomes refer to :h.e points .. playfti receives when he is
included in the winning coalition: h.s. they differ from payoffs. Agree-
ments where ? p .' Iyer is excluded from the win i .- coalition are not included
in the computation cf e :.<. .:: >r' outcomes (whereas they are inclr.de.cl in
calculating payoffs) . This em i • on outcomes and inclusion frequency
has led tc nura rous inconsis ... Les 'i.e., "strength is weakness'') between
the generally accepted a priori and the cost
hoc, measures of power. '
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Ironically, this emphasis on the predicted coalitions and the outcomes
of its members has resulted in a series of negative findings (e.g., Komorita
and Mcore, 1976; Murnighan, Komorita and Szwajkowski, 1977) for Minimum Power
theory, the model that has been derived from the Shapley value (Gamson, 1964)
.
The additional assumptions inherent in Minimum Power theory (see below),
however,, make tests of Minimum Power theory inconclusive as far as the Shapley
value is concerned. Analysis ef the players' payoffs would result in a more
appropriate test of the model. With the exception of two recent studies that
support the Shapley value predictions (Murnighan and Roth, 1977; Note 2),
research on coalitions has not reported such tests.
This study, then, assesses the relationship between the expectations
i
of payoffs, that the Shapley value indicates a player might have^ with observed
payoffs in four coalition games. It also tests four social psychological
models of coalition behavior and assesses their ability to predict the
frequencies of the different coalitions and the outcomes of the members of
these coalitions.
Theories of Coalition Behavior
Although many theories of coalition behavior have been proposed, only
those theories that predict both which coalitions are likely to form and the
reward division in these coalitions were considered in this study. The re-
striction excludes some important theories., such as Caplow's (1956) and
several normative theories of n-person cooperative games (c.f., Luce and
Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1970). Four theories meet the above criterion:
(1) Gamson' s (1961) Minimum Resource theory; (2) Minimum Power theory
(Gamson, 1964); (3) Komorita and Chertkoff* s (1973) Bargaining theory.; and
(4) Komorita's (1974) Weighted Probability model. i
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To compare and evaluate the four theories, groups of five persons parti-
cipated in four coalition situations (games) . In each game the resources of
the participants were manipulated by assigning each participant a certain
number of votes. These votes determined the combinations of players that
could form a winning (majority) coalition. The four games were: (1)
20(10-9-8-7-5); (2) 14(10-7-5-3-2); (3) 27(15-14-10-8-5); and (4) 30(24-9-
8-7-6) , where the first number denotes the number of votes needed to form a
winning (majority) coalition, and subsequent numbers denote the number of
votes (resources) at the disposal of each player. The players are identified
by letter (A, B, C, D, and E) in descending order of resources. The 14(10-
7-5-3-2) game will be used to illustrate the different predictions of the
four models.
,
Minimum Resource Theory . Gamson's (1961) theory is based on the assump-
tion of a "parity norm" which specifies that rewards be divided in direct
proportion to the resources of the coalition members. Thus, in the 14(10-
7-5-3-2) game, if the 10-5 coalition should form, the parity norm specifies
that the prize should be divided 10/15 for A and 5/15 for C, hereafter denoted
67-33 (percentage division of the prize). Assuming that individuals are
motivated to maximize their share of the reward, the theory predicts the
formation of the coalition that minimizes total resources and is just large
enough to win.
.
Since the 7-5-2 coalition is just large enough to win (it
exactly meets the quota of 14 votes), this coalition should be the most
likely to form and should divide the reward 50-36-14.
Minimum Power Theory . Minimum Power theory is based on the Shapley
value. For the five parties in the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game, 120 permutations
result in winning coalitions. Player A is pivotal in 48 cases (he has a
Shapley value of 12/30), players B and C are pivotal in 28 cases (Shapley
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values of 7/30 each), and players D and E are pivotal in 8 cases (Shapley
values of 2/30 each). If players are motivated to maximize their rewards,
and if they believe that rewards should be divided in direct proportion to
their Shapley values (Gamson, 1964) , the theory predicts that the players
will attempt to form a coalition that minimizes the sum of the coalition
members' Shapley values. (This approach is very similar to Minimum Resource
theory; the focus, however, is on the Shapley value rather than resources.)
i
Thus, the BCD, BCE and ADE coalitions, which result in a total Shapley value
of 16/30, are preferred to the two-person coalitions, which total 19/30
Shapley value. In addition, the theory predicts that the reward division
should be 43-43-14 for the BCD and BCE coalitions, 74-13-13 for the ADE
coalition, and 63-37 for the AB and AC coalitions.
Bargaining Theory . The basic assumption underlying Bargaining theory
(Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973) is that, in a given coalition, those members
who are "strong" in resources (above average) will expect and demand a share
of the rewards based on the parity norm, while those who are "weak" (below
average) will demand equality. For an iterated game over trials, the theory
makes differential predictions >on the initial trial and at the asymptotic
level. For the initial trial, the theory predicts that the rewards will be
the average of the rewards predicted by the parity and equality norms. At
i
i
the asymptote, the theory predicts that, for a given coalition, rewards will
be divided in direct proportion to each member's maximum expectation in
alternative coalitions. For example, if players A and C are negotiating
the division of rewards in the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game, A's maximum expectation
in alternative coalitions will be 67 (based on parity in the ADE coalition)
,
i
while C's maximum expectation will be 36 (based on parity in the BCE coalition).
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Converting the ratio of these expectations to a base of 100% yields asymp-
totic predictions of 65-35 for the AC coalition.
The theory postulates that the most likely coalition to form is the
one that minimizes coalition members' temptation to defect. This tempta-
tion is represented by the quantity E(0..-E..), where 0.. denotes the
predicted reward of individual i in coalition j_; E. . denotes his maximum
n—
expectation in alternative coalitions; and the summation is over the members
of coalition j_. In the 14(10-7-5-3-2) games, the temptation to defect is
minimized in the 10-5 coalition. In the 10-7 coalition (for a 59-41 divi-
sion), A will be tempted to form 10-5, while in the BCD or BCE coalition
(for a 37%-37%-25 split), B and C will be tempted to form a coalition with
A. Hence the theory predicts that the 10-5 coalition is most likely to i
occur.
The Weighted Probability Model . The basic assumption underlying the
Weighted Probability model (Komprita, 1974) is that, because of the logistic
problem of communicating offers and counteroffers, large coalitions are
more difficult to form than small ones. As the number of potential coali-
tion members increases, the severity of the problem of achieving both recip-
i
rocity and unanimous agreement on the terms of the offer also increases.
The number of potential defectors from the coalition also increases with
its size; hence, a large coalition is not only more difficult to form,
i
but may be more difficult to maintain. ' These hypotheses are supported by
the inverse relationship between group size and the cohesiveness of a group
reported by Cartwright and Zander (1968, p. 102).
In contrast with Bargaining theory, the Weighted Probability model
assumes that an individual's share of the prize should be a function of the
number and size of alternative winning coalitions available to him/her,
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rather than the quality of these alternatives. In the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game,
player A has three alternatives (AB, AC, and ADE) , including two two-person
i
coalitions. Players B and C each have three alternatives (AB or AC, BCD
and BCE) , including one two-person alternative. Players D and E have two
alternatives (ADE and BCE or BCE), each of which is a three-person coalition.
The present form of the model assigns twice as much of an "advantage" to
two-person opportunities as it does to three-person opportunities, and
predicts that the player's outcomes should be proportional to this "advan-
2
tage." Thus, in the two-person coalitions the outcomes should be 55-44;
in the ADE coalition, the outcomes should be 55-22-22; in the BCD and BCE
coalitions, the outcomes should be 40-40-20.
Finally, unlike the others, the Weighted Probability model makes an
exact probability prediction for each of the minimal-winning coalitions.
In a manner similar to the derivation of the reward division predictions,
player A should be included more than players B and C, who should be included
more than players D and E. For the five minimal-winning coalitions, the
predicted probability for AB and AC is .28, for BCD, BCE and ADE it is .14.
Predictions of Four Models. Table 1 shows the predictions of the four
models (and the Shapley value) for the four games used in this study. The
theories can be differentiated as follows: (1) In the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game,
Insert Table 1 About Here
Minimum Power theory and the Weighted Probability model make predictions
for coalition frequencies that differ from those of Minimum Resource and
Bargaining theory. Minimum Resource theory's prediction of the outcomes
of the included players differ from those of the other models. (2) All
of the models can be differentiated from one another on the basis of pre-
dictions for both coalition frequencies and outcomes for the 14(10-7-5-3-2)
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game. (3) In the 27(15-14-10-8-5) g?me, Minimum Resource and Minimum Power
theories can be differentiated from the other two models on the basis of
predictions for both coalition frequencies and outcomes. And (4) all the
models make different frequency predictions for the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game,
while Bargaining theory and the Weighted Probability model make predictions
of outcomes that differ from those of Minimum Resource theory.
The present study also extends the research on coalitions to five-person
groups. Most of the previous research has used three-person groups (cf.,
Chertkoff, 1970; Stryker, 1972). Recently it has been pointed out (Murnighan,
Note 1; Murnighan et al. , 1977) that the study of power in coalition situa-
3
tions requires study of groups with more than three players. While three-
person groups result in only one non-veto, non-dictatorship Shapley value
distribution, four-person groups result in additional distributions and five-
person groups expand the potential distributions even more. The games used
in this study, for instance, result in four different non-veto, non-dictator-
ship Shapley value distributions, thus increasing potential applicability
to more complex conflict situations.
Method
Subjects . The participants were 120 advanced undergraduate and graduate
student members of three sections of a behavioral science course in a commerce
department. The total payoffs students obtained in the bargaining games
and completion of a paper analyzing one's own strategies in each of the
games accounted for 20% of the course grade.
Individuals participated in five-person groups, yielding a total of 24
groups. Twelve of these groups were composed of five males; six included
one female; five included two females; and one included four females. All
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of the 20 female participants were graduate students, primarily majoring
4
in commerce.
Design. Each group played each of the four games in the study. Each
game was played for 12 trials. The five players in each group were assigned
different positions (A, B, C, D, or E) for each game. Thus, using groups as
the unit of analysis, the study resulted in three within-groups variables:
games (4), trials (12), and player positions (5). Each group played the
games in a different order. For the four games, there are 24 different game
orders, and each group played the games in one of the 24 orders. Thus,
order was completely counterbalanced.
The four games used in the study were those described in Table 1. The
second variable, trials, was defined as the formation of a winning coalition.
Participants were told that each session would continue for 12 trials.
Player positions were designated A, B, C, D and E, with player A having
the most resources, player B having the second most resources, etc.
Procedure. The participants were given general instructions about the
coalition games in the class prior to the first experimental session. Several
examples of the use of the procedure (in games that were not used later)
were discussed. The participants were informed that there would be 12 trials
in each game, and on each trial, the winning coalition would be allowed to
divide a prize of 100 points among its members. They were instructed to
do as well as they could (i.e., maximize their points) because their perfor-
mance would, and did in part, determine 20 percent of their grade in the
course. They were told that their payoffs in the games (called exercises
in class) would be compared to the payoffs of other students in the same
position as themselves. Thus, if they were player A in the 20(10-9-8-7-5)
game, their payoffs would be compared to the payoffs of other players
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in position A in the same game. It w&s emphasized, then, that their payoffs
would be compared to similar members of other groups rather than to members
of their own group.
Students were randomly assigned to groups, with the constraint that
they not be acquainted with the other members of their group. The members of
each group met for their sessions at the same hour each week for four weeks.
They were told which game they would be playing each week, but were not told
which of the five positions they would hold throughout each game. Partici-
pants were told that they would be in at least one strong position and at
least one weak position in each of the games. They were instructed that
they could discuss the games with other members of their class, but not to
discuss the games with members of their own group, In addition, the players
were encouraged to formulate strategies for each of the positions prior to
each game.
During the games, the players were seated around a set of opaque parti-
tions that shielded them from view of each other and the experimenter. At
each group's first session, the experimenter read specific instructions about
the procedures for the games. The players were told that each of them would
make offers on each trial by means of written "offer slips." These slips
required each player to "address" his offers (indicating to whom he/she
wished to send his/her offers) and also required a proposal regarding the
division of rewards for the. coalition members. For example, if player X
wished to form an XYZ coalition, he/she addressed offers to both persons
Y and Z and specified a division of the rewards (e.g., 50-25-25). A player
was required to send an offer slip to each of the players included in his/her
proposed coalition. If, for instance, a player proposed a three-person
coalition, he/she was instructed that the two offers he/she sent must be
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identical with regard to the proposed division of rewards; for example,
he/she could not send an offer to one pex'son to form one coalition and a
second, different offer to another person to form another coalition. This
procedure allowed two-, three-, and four-person coalitions to form in a
single step. Thus, although large coalitions are more difficult to form,
the difficulty is not inherent in the procedure. After the players had
completed the offers, the experimenter collected, examined and distributed
them to the proper persons.
After receiving an offer, each person could accept or reject it by
checking a space marked "Accept" or "Reject" at the bottom of the offer
slips. If a person received more than one offer, the person was allowed
to accept only one of them, unless the two offers proposed the identical
payoff division for the same coalition. Hence, each person could only
accept offers to form a single coalition on each trial. Furthermore, in
determining a winning coalition, any player's proposal, if accepted, was
considered to have priority over any offer he might accept, thus committing
him to his own offer. After the players had either accepted or rejected
their of fer(s) , the experimenter collected the offer slips and announced
the winning coalition, if one had formed. Subjects were informed that a
coalition would be declared the winning one if all the proposed coalition
partners accepted the offer. If no coalition formed because at least one
person rejected each of the proposed coalitions, the experimenter announced
that a coalition had not formed, and the procedure was repeated until a
coalition formed.
In order to familiarize the players with the procedure, a practice
trial was conducted before the start of the first session. Immediately
after the practice trial, the players were reassigned to their position
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for that game. A list of the resources e. , votes) for each position and
a list of the winning coalitions was also provided. No verbal communication
was permitted thereafter; hence, the players could not identify each other
once the session had begun.
The instructions were summ d for the players at the start of their
second, third, and fourth sessions. Practice, trials were not run, but infor-
mation about the player's position, the resources for each of the positions,
and the winning coalitions were distributed after the players were seated
behind the partitions. Thus, for each game, the players were not informed
of the identity of the players in the other positions.
Results
The results are presented in two parts. First, the most frequent
coalitions and the mean outcomes of the coalition members are presented
and compared to the theoretical predictions. Second, the payoffs of the
player positions in the games are analysed to determine where the power
differences lie, both between and within games. The differentiation between
outcomes and payoffs is important: Outcomes are defined as a player's
rewards when he/she is included in the winning coalition. These figures
do not include trials when a player is excluded from the winning coalition.
Payoffs, on the other hand, are determined by the total number of points
a player accumulates over the 12 trials. A payoff of zero is included for
trials where the player is excluded from the winning coalition. Outcomes,
then, are relevant for the theoretical tests; payoffs are relevant for
comparison with the Shapley value and for discussions of power.
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Coalition Frequencie s
The four most frequent coalitions (and the mean outcomes of the members
of these coalitions) are she In the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game, the
iert Tat About H< c
CDE coalition was most supporting the predictions of Minimum Re-
source and Bargaining theories. ,::i the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game, the AC coalition
was most frequent, supporting Bargaining theory. In the 27(15-14-10-8-5)
game, the AB coalition was most Erequent, supporting Bargaining theory and
the Weighted Probability model. Finally, in the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game, the
four two-person coalitions were more frequent that the 3CDE coalition, which
occurred only 38 times. Because none of the two-person coalitions appears
to be more frequent than any other, the Weighted Probability model's predic-
tion is supported.
The data for coalition frequencies, then, supports Bargaining theory
in three of four games, the Weighted Probability model in two games, Minimum
Resource theory in one game, and Minimum Power theory in none.
The Weighted Probability model also makes predictions for each minimum
winning coalition for each game. Previous research (Murnighan, et al
.
, 1977)
found strong support for its frequency predictions. For the 30(24-9-3-7-6)
game, the model predicts that each two-person, coalition should form 66 times.
The results are quite close to this prediction, with the exception of the AD
coalition. The predictions for the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game are 82 coalitions for
AB and AC; although AC is more frequent, the two coalitions approximate the
predicted total of 164. The model predicts equal frequencies for each of
the three-person coalitions in the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game. The data do not
support this prediction. Finally, the model predicts that the AB coalition
should form 72 times in the 27(15-14-10-8-5) game, and that each of the
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winning three -person coalitions should form 36 times. Although the AB coali-
tion is most frequent, the entire, set of data in this game do not support
this prediction.
Coalition Members' Out
The outcomes of the members of the winning coalitions are shown in
Table 2. Confidence intervals (a=.01) were constructed around the mean
outcomes for the players in each of the most frequent coalitions. Theore-
tical predictions of the players' outcomes that fall within the confidence
intervals are counted as support for the theory: predictions falling outside
the interval are counted as lack of support. The findings are summarized
in Table 3. The results indicate that none of the models made particularly
Insert Table 3 About Here
accurate predictions for the players in positions C, D, and E in the
20(10-9-8-7-5) game. Minimum resource theory made particularly inaccurate
predictions. Minimum Power theory and the Weighted Probability model's
predictions of equal splits among the players underestimated C's mean out-
comes and overestimated position E's mean outcomes. Bargaining theory, on
the other hand, was the best predictor for both positions C and E, even
though its prediction for position E (i.e., 32,35) fell slightly outside the
confidence interval. Similarly, its prediction for position D (also 32.35)
also fell just outside the confidence interval.
The comparisons in the other games also favor Bargaining theory over
the other models. Its only failing occurred for the AC coalition in the
30(24-9-8-7-6) game, where all the models predicted 75-25 splits and were
incorrect. Player A's outcomes in this coalition were higher than expected
by any of the models, and were also considerably higher than the other two-
person coalitions in this game.
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Considering the two criteria, coalition quencies and the members'
outcomes, indicates that Bargaining tl ?ory is decidedly superior on both
dimensions to the other models teste this study. Minimum Power theory
appears to be particularly inadequate.
Payoffs
An analysis of variance using games (4), player positions (5), and trial
blocks (4 blocks of 3 trials each) as independent variables (all repeated
measures) and the players' mean payoffs in each trial block as the dependent
variable resulted in significant effects for player position: F(4,92)=
132.17, p_<.0Q0l; and for the games by player positions interaction: F(12,275)=
54.87, _p<.0001. Other effects were not significant. (It should be noted
that it was not possible for the games' main effect to be significant, due
to the constant total payoff in each game.) The means for the games by
player positions interaction are shown in Table 4. Post hoc tests of this
Insert Table 4 About Here-
interaction indicated numerous differences among the player positions in
the four games. Players in position A in the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game, for
instance, received considerably higher payoffs than any of the other posi-
tions. Position A in the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game and positions A and B in the
27(15-14-10-8-5) game also received high payoffs. The significant difference
between positions A and B in the 27(15-14-10-8-5) game indicates that, in
this situation, the player with fewer resources held the better position,
indicative of the "strength is weakness" phenomenon. Similar results were
found in the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game, where the "low" resource positions, C, D,
and E, obtained higher payoffs than the "high" resource positions, A and B.
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The Shapley Value
Comparisons of the player positions' mean payoffs with the Shapley
value also utilized confidence intervals with a=.01. Comparisons yielded
the following results: (1) In the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game, support (where +
indicates that the Shapley value felJ within the confidence interval and -
indicates that it did not) for positions (A, B, C, D, E) was (-, +, -, +, -)
respectively; (2) In the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game, support was (-, +, +, +, +)
,
again for (A, B, C, D, E) ; (3) In the 27(15-14-10-8-5) game, support was
(+, -, -, +, +); and (4) In the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game, support was (-, +, -,
-, +) . Thus, in 11 out of 20 tests, the Shapley value prediction for payoffs
was supported.
A comparison of the Shapley value predictions across games was made by
correlating the rank ordering of all 20 observed payoffs with the ranked
predictions for each position. The results yielded a highly significant
correlation: jr(20) = .92, p<.0001. Thus, although the Shapley value's pre-
dictions of the absolute magnitudes of the players' payoffs was only mar-
ginally supported, its predictions of the relative magnitude of the payoffs
in this study were strongly supported.
Discussion
The results of the theoretical comparisons are quite clear. Bargaining
theory's predictions surpass those of the other models, for both coalition
frequencies and for outcomes. The Weighted Probability model received some
support, but did not compare favorably with Bargaining theory, especially
in the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game where their predictions differ most. Minimum
Resource and, in particular, Minimum Poller theories received little support.
With the other recent negative findings for both models in games with more
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than three players, the applicability of these early models to more complex
coalitions situations is very questionable.
Bargaining theory's predictions narrox^ly missed support by the outcomes
of positions D and E in the 20(10-9-8-7-6) game, as discussed earlier, and
were not supported by the coalition frequencies in the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game.
However, the differences between the predictions of the Weighted Probability
model, the only model supported for coalition frequencies in the 30(24-9-8-7-6)
game, and Bargaining theory are almost negligible in this case. While the
Weighted Probability model predicts that any of the two-person coalitions
should form, Bargaining theory predicts that the AE coalition should be more
frequent than the other two-person coalitions. Because "more frequent"
has not been quantitatively defined by the model, the prediction of the
most frequent coalition has been emphasized. In this case, the choice of
the AE coalition as being more frequent depends upon relatively minor differ-
8
ences in the players' calculated temptations to defect. This minor error,
then, is all that separates Bargaining theory from being supported in all
four ga^es in this study. With the positive results in other recent studies
(Komorita and Moore, 1976; Michener, Fleishman and Vaske, 1977; Murnighan,
et al. , 1977), the model has received strong support. Future research on
Bargaining theory, then, might attempt to pinpoint the boundary conditions
of the model and increase the likelihood that future theoretical formula-
tions might expand those boundaries.
The comparisons with the Shapley value were not quite so clear.
Ironically, where coalition frequencies and players' outcomes did not sup-
port the social psychological model fathered by the Shapley value, i.e.,
Minimum Power theory, the players' payoffs tended to support the predictions
of the Shapley value, particularly across the entire set of positions.
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Although additional research is necess, ire a final judgment of the
predictive validity of the model can be rendered, recent research in coali-
tion situations where one player was a monopolist (Murnighan and Roth, 1977;
Note 2) also supported its predictions. Thus, although the process attributed
to the original formulation (that players are added to coalitions one at a
time and receive all marginal payoffs when they join) may not represent the
actual bargaining process, the reformulation of the Shapley value as a car-
dinal utility, indicating what a risk neutral player might expect to receive
from playing a game, appears to be correct, empirically as well as mathe-
matically.
Using the players' payoffs as a measure of power indicates that position
A in the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game is the most powerful of the 20 positions in this
study. The strength of this position was apparent prior to play of the game.
However, the use of payoffs as a measure of power allows for comparisons
between the payoffs of positions in different games, thus increasing under-
standing of the relative power of the different position/game combinations.
The power (payoffs) of position A in the 30(24-9-8-7-6) game, for instance,
appears to be comparable to the combined power (payoffs) of positions A and
B in the 27(15-14-10-8-5) game. Within a single game, the power (payoffs)
of position A in the 14(10-7-5-3-2) game appears to be comparable to the
combined power (payoffs) of positions B and C, Thus, when coalition games
are used as models of more complex conflict situations, the payoffs of the
different positions can be used as a post hoc measure of the power of those
positions, and this measure, because it has a fixed zero point, appears to
be a ratio scale.
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Strength and Weaknes s
The "strength is weakness" hypothesis that has been so prevalent in the
results of three-person games can be tested by the data in the 20(10-9-8-7-5)
game, where am' three players can form a winning coalition. Positions C, D,
and E received significantly higher payoffs than positions A and B, and posi-
tion A received the lowest payoff of any of the positions, thus supporting
the hypothesis. The "strength is weakness" hypothesis does not, however,
apply to all of the games in this study. In the other three games, positions
x<d.th more resources generally obtained higher payoffs. Thus, to some degree
the results also indicate that "strength is strength." However, even in
these games, there is evidence of "strength" being "weakness." For instance,
position E obtained significantly higher payoffs than position C in the
27(15-14-10-8-5) game, even though E's resources are only half of C's. In
the same game, position B obtained significantly higher payoffs than position
A. The superiority of positions A and B over positions C, D. and E, however,
indicate that greater resources, at times, increase strength. Thus, in this
game, "strength is strength" and "strength is weakness." What conditions
differentiate these two effects? The data from this study support the conclu-
sion that, in a particular game, when positions have equal Shapley values but
different resources, the position with less resources generally obtains equal
or higher payoffs than the position with more resources. Thus, in the
20(10-9-8-7-5) game, the "e>rtra" resources held by position A work to his
disadvantage. In each of the games, players in positions with identical
Shapley values tended to receive equal or lower payoffs than players in
positions with less resources. Although all of the comparisons of this type
did not yield significant differences, the results are almost always in the
right direction. Future research with other games is necessary to substantiate
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this conclusion. However, it appears from this study that the "strength is
weakness" phenomenon is contingent on identical Shapley values for positions
within the same game.
Examination of students' comments in the papers they wrote describing
their strategies also yields an answer to the question of why "strength" is
sometimes "weakness." Many of the players adopted the parity norm (the basis
of Gamson's Minimum Resource theory) in order to structure the situation and
formulate strategies. Thus, these players emphasized the resources of the
different positions and bargained accordingly. Other players adopted philo-
sophies more in line with the Weighted Probability model and the Shapley
value, by focusing on the interchangeability of certain players in different
coalitions (e.g., any three players can win in the 20(10-9-8-7-5) game).
Neither group of analysts constituted a majority of the players. However,
both groups tended to conclude that, at least initially, players with smaller
amounts of resources may be more receptive to a given offer than players with
more resources. This is true even if the players do not focus on resources:
they also recognized this philosophy and zhe possibility that other players
might adopt it. Thus, a player with the least resources necessary to complete
9
a coalition will be chosen over players with more resources, at least at the
start of the game. From a reinforcement point of view, coalitions that form
early in the bargaining should become more and more likely as the trials
progress. Thus, this early inclination to send offers to those with less
resources leads to their more frequent inclusion in the winning coalition,
higher payoffs in the game, and support of the "strength is weakness" pheno-
monen. This effect may erode over trials (e.g., Kelley and Arrowood, 1960)
with reference to coalition frequencies; however, the overall effect on
payoffs (this study's measure of power) should not change.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This explanation of the Shapley value assumes that winning coali-
tions receive a constant payoff. If the payoffs vary across coalitions, a
more complicated formula must be used to take the value of the different
payoffs into account.
2. This "advantage" or weight is determined by the equation
l/(n.-l)
L(C) =y El/(n-l)
where P(C.) = the probability of coalition i, n. = the number of members of
-
-J.
•»
'
-1
coalition j_ and the summation is over all minimum winning coalitions. The
probability of inclusion for a particular player is equal to the sum of the
probabilities that the coalitions of which he/she is a member will form.
The players' predicted payoff is proportional to his/her probability of
inclusion. Four-person coalitions, by the way, are i^eighted (give a player
the "advantage" of) one-third of a two-person coalition.
3. Gamson (1961) has defined a "full-fledged coalition situation" as
consisting of more than two players who are attempting to maximize their
share of the rewards, with no player having dictatorial or veto power, and
with no condition in which all the players can jointly maximize their payoffs.
4. Vinacke (1959) has hypothesized, and found evidence for, differences
in coalition behavior between males and females. A check on the possibility
that sex systematically affected the data was conducted. Vinacke' s anti-
competitive hypothesis predicts that females should do well in relatively
weak positions and poorly in relatively strong positions. If a total of
240 points is used as the criterion for determining weak/strong positions in
these games (240=total points awarded per session, 1200, divided by five
players) , females were observed to score above the sample average 16 of 35
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times (46%) for strong positions and 23 of 45 times (51%) for weak positions.
Thus, it appears that the sex of the players had no appreciable effect on
the results.
5. Some scheduling problems did arise. Groups that were unable to meet
for four consecutive weeks generally missed one session and completed the
games in five weeks. Some groups also participated in two games the same
day.
6. In some situations, two or three proposals to form a coalition were
accepted on the same trial. For instance, if A sent an offer to C, D sent
an offer to A, and both offers were accepted, AC would be declared the winning
coalition because A was commited to his/her offer (invalidating his/her
acceptance). If three coalitions formed in this manner, with each being
invalidated by another, the players were informed of the situation and the
trial was rerun.
7. Complete tables of the frequency and outcomes for each of the coali-
tions are available from the author.
8. The total temptation to defect for players A and. E in the AE coali-
tion is .05. For the AD coalition, the total is .10; for AC, .125; for AB,
.18. Total temptations to defect for coalitions that are not predicted to
form in this study range up to .66. Whether the change from .05 to .18
is sufficiently apparent to the players can be questioned (and studied in
future research) . Such data might determine whether Bargaining theory can
make more specific predictions of the frequencies of the different coalitions.
9. While game theory would describe the tendency to send offers to
players with less resources as irrational, such a strategy is subjectively
rational (Simon, 1976) for players who emphasize the importance of resources
and for players who recognize the possibility that other players might adopt
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such a philosophy. For this latter group, directing one's offers to players
with less resources increases the probability of their acceptance, and is
therefore rational (given equal offers)
.
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